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I. INTRODUCTION
For over half a century until its 2020 decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma,1 the United 
States Supreme Court evaluated alleged congressional abrogation of Indian treaty rights 
differently based on whether the alleged abrogation was of usufructuary rights (e.g., 
s reservation). Without 
justification, the Supreme Court applied a less stringent test for evaluating alleged 
abrogation of rights to a homeland than it applied to alleged abrogation of usufructuary 
rights.
The
usufructuary rights follow a logical path. First, due to the particular nature of treaties with 
Indian tribes, and due to the negotiating disadvantage of the tribes, treaty rights are 
established by construing the relevant contract (i.e., treaty) as the signatory tribes would 
have understood i .2 Second, and again due 
to the particular nature of treaties with Indian tribes, abrogation of those rights requires 
express Congressional intent.3
* Lauren King is a citizen of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and serves on the Nation s Mvskoke Reservation 
Protection Commission. She chairs the Native American law practice group at Foster Garvey, P.C. 
 1. 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020). 
      2.   See 1 COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02 (2019); Richard B. Collins, Never Construed 
to Their Prejudice: In Honor of David Getches, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 5 9 (2013). 
      3.   See 1 COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at § 2.02. 
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In contrast, determining whether Congress had 
abrogated tribal rights to a homeland included consideration of extratextual factors, such 
as subsequent demographic change following passage of a statute. 
McGirt v. Oklahoma corrected this unequal treatment of treaty rights by jettisoning 
treaty right to a homeland, absent ambiguity in the statutory language.  
II. THE DISPARATE STANDARDS FOR TREATY RIGHT ABROGATION
Since the turn of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has adhered to the plenary 
bes.4 The 
Court has established high standards for congressional abrogation of treaty usufructuary 
rights, counterbalancing the great weight it attaches to the solemnity of treaty promises in 
the Indian canon and the unique trust relationship shared between Indian tribes and the 
federal government. However, prior to McGirt, the Court had established a much lower 
reservation diminishment is irreconcilable with the Indian canons of construction and with 
A. The Indian Canons 
Courts must construe treaties 
5 Th never be 
6 Courts must not restrict a treaty right by using the 
7
which might some time be urged aga 8
9 Ambiguities in treaties must be 
10 the narrowest 
construction it will bear 11 The canons have been extended to apply to statutes and 
executive orders as well.12
4. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903); see also Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 
U.S. 782, 782 (2014). 
5. Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899); see also Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1699 (2019); 
, 443 U.S. 658, 676 77 (1979) 
(hereinafter Fishing Vessel ); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684 (1942); Seufert Bros. Co. v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 194, 198 (1919). 
6. Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 396 (1902) (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 582 
(1832)); see also Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199 (1975) ( The canon of construction applied over a 
century and a half by this Court is that the wording of treaties and statutes ratifying agreements with the Indians 
is not to be construed to their prejudice. ). 
7. Jones, 175 U.S. at 11; see also Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 676. 
8. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908). 
9. Seufert Bros., 249 U.S. at 199. 
10. Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1699; Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 194 n.5 
(1999); Cty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992); 
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 642 (1970). 
11. Tulee, 315 U.S. at 684. 
12. See, e.g., Cty. of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 269; Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 
(1985); , 411 U.S. 173, 173 75 (1973). 
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The rationale for the Indian canons of construction lies in the numerous 
disadvantages the tribes had in treaty negotiations and in the unique trust relationship 
between the United States and Indian tribes.  
on the part of the United States, an 
enlightened and powerful nation, by representatives skilled in diplomacy, masters of a 
written language, understanding the modes and forms of creating the various technical 
wholly unfamiliar with all the forms of legal expression, and whose only knowledge of the 
terms in which the treaty [wa]s framed [wa]s that imparted to them by the interpreter 
13 Given the severely disadvantaged position of the tribes 
in these negotiations,  are carried 
out, so far as possible, . . . in a spirit which generously recognizes the full obligation of 
14
With respect to the trust relationship between the United States and Indian tribes, 
the Supreme Court held in its earliest Indian law cases that by entering into treaties, tribes 
15 Tribes 
government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to 
ward to his 
guardian 16
The Constitution entrusts Congress with the authority to regulate commerce with 
17 The 
supremacy of Indian treaties, the weight given to treaty promises, and the deference the 
Indian canons accord the breadth of those promises demand an accordingly high bar for 
abrogation of treaty rights. Although the Supreme Court has established a relatively high 
bar for abrogation of treaty usufructuary rights, it has established an inexplicably low bar 
for abrogation of treaty rights to a homeland, i.e., for reservation disestablishment. 
B. The High Bar for Abrogation of Treaty Usufructuary Rights 
Since the turn of the century when the Supreme Court ruled that Congress could 
unilaterally abrogate tribal treaty rights pursuant to its plenary power over Indian affairs,18
the Court has developed a stringent standard requiring a clear statement of congressional 
intent to abrogate treaty usufructuary rights.19 For example, in 1968 in Menominee Tribe 
of Indians v. United States, the Court declined to construe a statute terminating federal 
recognition of the Menominee Tribe 
13. Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899). 
14. Tulee, 315 U.S. at 684 85. 
15. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 581. 
16. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 14, 17 (1831); see also Antoine, 420 U.S at 199. 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; id. art. VI, cl. 2. 
18. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. 553. 
    19.   See Collins, supra note 2, at 
fishing rights] cannot be reconciled, tribes won most cases and all of the important ones, and decisions often 
3
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20
believe that Congress, without explicit statement, would subject the United States to a 
claim fo 21
By 1999, when the Court decided Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa 
Indians,22 the rule regarding treaty usufructuary right abrogation was well established: 
e Indian treaty rights, but it must clearly express its intent to do 
23
and convey to the United States, any and all right, title, and interest, of whatsoever nature 
the same may be, which they may now have in, and to any other lands in the Territory of 
24 but that was silent as to usufructuary rights, did not extinguish 
the usufructuary rights that were reserved to the Band in a prior treaty.25
In 2019, the Court further clarified its stance on abrogation of treaty usufructuary 
rights in Herrera v. Wyoming.26
s.27
Importantly, the Court expressly repudiated Ward v. Race Horse,28 a century-old case 
29 The Race Horse court also 
30
In considering the familiar question of whether statehood implicitly abrogated a 
treaty right, the Court in Herrera
termination analysis is whether Congress has expressly abrogated an Indian treaty right or 
whether a termination point identified in the treaty itself has been satisfied. Statehood is 
intent to abrogate a treaty, or statehood appears as a termination point i 31
Because the parties in Herrera disputed whether Race Horse had continuing force, the 
Race Horse 
[Mille Lacs day that Race Horse is 
repudiated to the extent it held that treaty rights can be impliedly extinguished at 
32
Because the Wyoming Statehood Act was silent as to Indian treaty rights and the 
 20. 391 U.S. 404, 412 (1968). 
21. Id. at 413 (footnote omitted).  
 22. 526 U.S. 172 (1999). 
23. Id. at 202. 
24. Id. at 195 (quoting 1855 Treaty with the Chippewa, 10 Stat. 1166). 
25. Id. at 200. 
 26. 139 S. Ct. 1686. 
27. Id.
 28. 163 U.S. 504 (1896). 
29. Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1694 95 (quoting Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 509). 
30. Id. at 1695 (quoting Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 509, 515). 
31. Id. at 1696 (citing Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 207). 
32. Id. at 1697. 
4
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treaty negotiations did not show that the Crow Tribe understood the treaty to sunset its 
hunting rights at statehood, the Court in Herrera held that Congress had not abrogated the 
33
The strict standard the Court has adopted to evaluate alleged abrogation of treaty 
usufructuary rights stands in stark contrast to the startlingly lax standard it has adopted to 
evaluate alleged abrogation of treaty rights to a homeland.  
C. The Solem Standard for Abrogation of Treaty Rights to a Homeland 
coun
34
c 35 The 1948 enactment resulted in a steady stream of 
ions survived the allotment era.36 In 1984 
in Solem v. Bartlett,37 the Court formalized a three-part test for reservation 
disestablishment that drastically and indefensibly
To be sure, the better course of action at that time would have been to align the 
reservation disestablishment test with the relatively bright-line test for treaty usufructuary 
right abrogation. Instead, Solem 
standards it laid out in its earlier disestablishment cases.  
Things started off well enough. In its 1962 decision in Seymour v. Superintendent of 
Washington State Penitentiary,38
reservation was not diminished by a 1906 allotment act that allotted 
to tribal members and opened surplus lands to non-Indian settlement. Absent clear 
congressional language, the Court refused to assume Congress intended for the land to 
revert to the public domain.39 The Court found that, rather than returning the land to the 
public domain, the allotment act was simply a mechanism for non-Indians to settle on land 
within the reservation.40 In dicta, the Court noted that its understanding of the purpose of 
explicit recognition of the continued existence of the reservation by Congress.41
A similar all Mattz v. 
Arnett.42 Holding that the act had the same effect as the one in Seymour, the Court 
reaffirmed that mere allotment and opening of surplus lands within a reservation to non-
Indian settlement i
33. Id. at 1698 700. 
 34.  18 U.S.C § 1151. 
 35. Id.
36. See Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 
(1998); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994); Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. 
Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 
(1973); Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).  
 37. 465 U.S. 463 (1984). 
 38. 368 U.S. 351 (1962). 
 39. Id. at 355. 
40. Id. at 356. 
41. Id. 
 42. 412 U.S. 481 (1973). 
5
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not employed in the 1892 Act. This being so, we are not inclined to infer an intent to 
43 As in Seymour, the Court observed 
that our conclusion that the 1892 Act did not terminate the Klamath River Reservation is 
reinforced by repeated recognition of the reservation status of the land after 1892 by the 
44 The Court reiterated that clear 
congressional intent is required to effect disestablishment, but introduced unfortunate 
language that would serve to distort the focus of the disestablishment inquiry in subsequent 
 Act 
or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history 45
Just two years later in DeCoteau v. District County Court,46 the Court seized on the 
language from Mattz to give greater weight to extratextual factors in evaluating whether 
the Lake Traverse reservation had been diminished. The 1891 act at issue obligated the 
Sisseton-Wahpeton Indian Tribe 
all their claim, right, title, and interest in and to all the unallotted lands within the limits of 
 in exchange for payment of a sum certain.47 The Court held that this 
language revealed clear congressional intent to diminish the reservation.  
The Court reaffirmed to
(d)oubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the 
weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its 
protection and good faith. 48 The Court further acknowledged that events subsequent to 
rgely irrelevant to the issues before us. 49 However, 
the Court spent several pages of its analysis detailing what happened in the decades after 
Congress passed the act. That discussion revealed conflicting evidence regarding whether 
entities other than Congress believed the reservation still existed.50 The Court ultimately 
point[ed] unmistakably to the conclusion that the Lake Traverse Reservation was 
terminated in 1891 51
In dissent, Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall accused the majority of 
manufacturing congressional intent.52 Because the 1891 act obligating the Tribe to sell its 
rd to 
Congress did not intend to disestablish the reservation.53
Two years later in 1977, the Court held in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip that an act 
requiring the Rosebud 
43. Id. at 504. 
44. Id. at 505. 
45. Id. at 505 (emphasis added). 
 46. 420 U.S. 425 (1975). 
 47. Sioux Land Agreement of 1889, U.S.-Sioux, art. I, Dec. 12, 1889, 26 Stat. 1036. 
48. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 444 (quoting McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
(quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930))).  
49. Id. at 437 38. 
50. Id. at 442 44. 
51. Id. at 445. 
52. Id. at 460 63. 
53. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 461 (quoting 26 Stat. 1036). 
6
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States all their claim, right, title, and interest in and to all that part of the Rosebud Indian 
to di 54 Despite the canon requiring the Court not to use technicalities or 
construe ambiguities in a manner that would prejudice the Indians, the Court disregarded 
wording in the act that required consent of the Tribe for the surrender of its lands (which 
the lack of consent did not defeat disestablishment.55
The Court also accorded subsequent jurisdictional history much greater weight in 
Rosebud Sioux Tribe than it had in its prior opinions. The Court admitted that the 
in the years 
since the pa
56 The Court emphasized that:  
The longstanding assumption of jurisdiction by the State over an area that is over 90% non-
Indian both in population and in land[] 
of the meaning of the Act, but has created justifiable expectations which should not be upset 
by so strained a reading of the Acts of Congress as petitioner urges.57
The Court also held that two subsequent congressional acts containing similar language 
e 58
As in Decoteau, the dissent in Rosebud Sioux Tribe objected to a finding of 
diminishment absent clear congressional language, noting that the three acts contained no 
but instead merely opened the 
reservation land to white settlers.59 The dissent lamented that: 
Until today, the effect on reservation boundaries of Acts disposing of surplus reservation 
land was well settled. The general rule, entitled to the broadest possible scope, is that in 
interpreting these Acts[,] legal ambiguities are resolved to the benefit of the Indians . . . . 
Congressional intent therefore must b
established by Congress (or the Executive) was disestablished.60
Despite these well-
intent in its diminishment analysis, the Court formally embraced extratextual factors in the 
analytical framework for reservation diminishment that it announced in Solem v. 
Bartlett.61
Solem
 reservation has been diminished.62 According to 
Solem, this structure comprises three principles: 
 54. 430 U.S. 584, 597 (1977). 
55. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 597. 
56. Id. at 603 04. 
57. Id. at 604 05. 
58. Id. at 607 15. 
59. Id. at 618 19. 
60. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 617 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 61. 465 U.S. 463 (1984). 
62. Id. at 470. 
7
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1.
boundaries. Once a block of land is set aside for an Indian Reservation and 
no matter what happens to the title of individual plots within the area, the 
entire block retains its reservation status until Congress explicitly indicates 
63
congress
evidencing the present and total surrender of all tribal interests strongly 
suggests that Congress meant to divest from the reservation all unalloted 
[sic] 64 If Congress also commits to compensate the tribe for 
65
2. -particularly 
the manner in which the transaction was negotiated with the tribes involved 
-held, 
contemporaneous understanding that the affected reservation would shrink 
66
of cession and unconditional compensation are not prerequisites for a 
67
3.  . . events that occurred after the passage 
68 Such events 
in which the Bureau of Indian Affairs and local judicial authorities dealt 
with unalloted [sic] 
69 Where a flood of non-Indians settled the opened lands 
de facto, if not de
jure, 70
Solem 71 and the Court did not question 
why the standard for abrogation of tribal treaty rights varied depending on whether the 
treaty right alleged to have been abrogated was a right to a homeland or a right to hunt, 




65. Id. at 470 71. 





 71. The Court followed Solem s analytical framework in Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994); South Dakota 
v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998); and Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016). 
8
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and entry under the provisions of the 
with proceeds 




412 U.S. 481 
(1973) 
Klamath River Reservation subject to 
settlement, entry, and purchase under the laws 
of the United States granting homestead 
rights with proceeds 
provided that Indians may 
Secretary of the Interior for an allotment
the Secretary  lands on which 
[ir] permanent 





420 U.S. 425 
(1975) 
or Sioux Indians hereby cede, sell, relinquish, 
and convey to the United States all their claim, 
right, title, and interest in and to all the 
unallotted lands within the limits of the 
reservation . . . remaining a
to the Indians in exchange for a sum certain 
payment from the United States, and the ceded 
lands ar
under homestead laws, with proceeds to be 
 of the said 






430 U.S. 584 
(1977) 
Act of Apr. 23, 1904, 33 Stat. 254: 
Reservation . . . cede, surrender, grant, and 
convey to the United States all their claim, 
right, title, and interest to all that part of the 
Rosebud Indian Reservation now remaining 
unallotted and the ceded lands 
disposed of under the general provisions of 
the homestead and town-site laws of the 
United States, and shall be opened to 
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to the Rosebud Indians or expended on 
their account
Act of Mar. 2, 1907, 34 Stat. 1230:  
of all that portion of the 
Rosebud Indian Reservation . . . except such 
portions thereof as have been . . . allotted to 
Indians,  and the ceded lands 
disposed of . . . under the general provisions 
of the homestead and town-site laws of the 
United States, and shall be opened to 
settlement and entry,  with proceeds to be 
their account
Act of May 30, 1910, c. 260, 36 Stat. 448: 
and dispose of all that portion of the 
Rosebud Indian Reservation
Indians with allotments in the ceded lands 
may in lieu thereof on the 
and the ceded land 
provisions of the homestead and town-site 
laws of the United States, and shall be 
deposited in the Treasury of 
the United States to the credit of said Indians 
[and that] shall be at all times subject to 
appropriation by Congress for their 
education, support, and civilization
Solem v. Bartlett,
465 U.S. 463 
(1984) 
[S]ell and dispose of all that portion of the 
Cheyenne River and Standing Rock Indian 
reservations
disposed of . . . under the general provisions of 
the homestead and town-site laws of the United 
States, and shall be opened to settlement and 
provided that Indians with allotments in 
the sold 
thereof an allotment anywhere within the 
respective reservations thus diminished  with 
proceeds to be deposited in the Treasury of the 
United States to the credit of said Indians [and 
that] shall be expended for their benefit under 
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Hagen v. Utah,
510 U.S. 399 
(1994) 
Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 263: 
Allotments shall be made for the Indians of 
the Uintah and the White River tribes of Ute 
Indians
lands within said reservation shall be restored 
to the public domain,  provided [t]hat
persons entering any of said land under the 
homestead law shal
Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1069:
for opening [the Uintah 
Reservation] shall be extended to the first of 
September, [1905],  and certain unallotted 
lands of under the general 
provisions of the homestead and town-site 
laws of the United States, and shall be 
with the 
proceeds to be used [1902 
Reservation
diminished. 
South Dakota v. 
Yankton Sioux 
Tribe, 522 U.S. 
329 (1998) 
The Yankton tribe of Dakota or Sioux Indians 
hereby cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the 
United States all their claim, right, title, and 
interest in and to all the unallotted lands within 
the limits of the reservation set apart to said 
Indians in exchange for a sum certain payment 
from the United States, and the ceded lands 
shall be , and shall be 
subject to disposal under the homestead and 
town-site laws of the United States. Act of 




Parker, 136 S. 
Ct. 1072 (2016)
Indians . . . the Secretary of the Interior . . . is 
authorized to cause to be surveyed, if 
necessary, and sold under such rules and 
regulations as he may prescribe
en for settlement
proceed
Indians in the Treasury of the United States
Act of Aug. 7, 1882, 22 Stat. 341. 
Reservation not 
diminished. 
If one focuses solely on the express statutory text, the varying outcomes of these 
cases appear irreconcilable. To the extent McGirt
analysis of reservation disestablishment and diminishment claims, it is only because
11
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McGirt righted the ship. 
III. MCGIRT CORRECTS THE TEST FOR TREATY RIGHTS ABROGATION, REJECTING 
CONSIDERATION OF EXTRATEXTUAL FACTORS.
In McGirt and Sharp v. Murphy, the Court evaluated whether Oklahoma had 
jurisdiction to prosecute two Indian defendants for major crimes committed on lands 
72 If the 
reservation had not been disestablished, the State lacked jurisdiction.73
The State of Oklahoma, the United States, and numerous others invited the Supreme 
Court to further lower the already indefensibly low bar for reservation disestablishment in 
evaluating whether Congress had disestablished the reservation the United States promised 
to the Muscogee (Creek) Nation in its 1866 treaty. 
Oklahoma and the United States urged the Court to find congressional abrogation of 
instead through a series of events that restricted tribal authority and assets. Oklahoma 
argued that disestablishment need not be achieved in one fell swoop of the legislative pen, 
but instead could be achieved by the federal government taking steps over a course of 
d assets.74 In Murphy,
w
congressional abrogation 75 76
But it would be Oklahoma that toppled if the Court found that the Muscogee (Creek) 
reservation still existed, Oklahoma warned. Oklahoma argued that such a decision would 
cleaving the State in half ] the largest 
would shock the 1.8 
million residents of eastern Oklahoma who have universally understood that they reside 
77 On top of that, it would plunge 
78 Oklahoma 
emphasized that a finding that the reservation was still exta
settled expectations across half of Oklahoma, including the major metropolitan area 
79
80
72. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. 2452; Sharp v. Murphy, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020). 
73. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2459. 
74. See Brief for Respondent, McGirt, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (No. 18-9526); Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, McGirt, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (No. 18-9526). 
75. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 17-1107). 
76. Id. 
77. Brief of Petitioner at 3, Sharp v. Murphy, 139 S. Ct. 626 (No. 17-1107). 
78. Id. at 3 4.
79. Id. at 56. 
80. Brief for Respondent at 40, McGirt, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (No. 18-9526). 
12
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81
Oklahoma did not go so far as to argue that the Court should modify the test from 
Solem; instead, it argued that Solem did not require any clear language from Congress in 
order to discern congressional intent to disestablish a reservation.82
But others felt that this case exposed the shortcomings of Solem and provided a 
strong basis for modifying the test for disestablishment and diminishment. Specifically, 
en banc review in Murphy v. Royal 
(which would become Murphy v. Sharp at the Supreme Court) made the bold suggestion 
that the Court give even heavier weight to extratextual factors, including demographic 
change, in determining whether Congress disestablished a reservation: 
I am not without sympathy f
effectively constitute disestablishment, but the panel properly rejected that argument: Solem
no matter what 
happens to the title of individual plots within the area, the entire block retains its reservation 
(emphasis added); see also Murphy, 866 F.3d at 1219 (explaining that allotment alone cannot 
terminate a reservation under Supreme Court precedent).  
Supreme Court precedent thus requires that evidence of intent to disestablish be 
Nebraska v. Parker,  U.S. , 136 S.Ct. 1072, 1080 81, 194 L.Ed.2d 
152 (2016). History, however, is not always well suited to provide the unequivocal evidence 
of disestablishment that Solem requires. . . . Solem -Indian 
settlers flooded into the opened portion of a reservation and the area has long since lost its 
Indian character . . . de facto, if not de jure
471, 104 S.Ct. 1161. . . . This case may present the high-water mark of de facto
disestablishment: the boundaries of the Creek Reservation outlined by the panel opinion 
encompass a substantial non-Indian population, including much of the city of Tulsa; and 
Oklahoma claims the decision will have dramatic consequences for taxation, regulation, and 
law enforcement. The panel faithfully applied Supreme Court precedent holding that such 
Murphy, 866 F.3d at 1232. But this may be the rare case where the 
Supreme Court wishes to enhance Steps Two and Three of Solem if it can be persuaded that 
the square peg of Solem is ill suited for the round hole of Oklahoma statehood.83
The Supreme Court rejected these invitations to find disestablishment without a clear 
expression of congressional intent. Instead, the Court eschewed the latter two principles in 
Solem, aligning its reservation disestablishment test with the test for abrogation of other 
types of treaty rights.  
laws passed by Congress at the first step, contemporary events at the second, and even 
, absent ambiguity, 
84
81. Id. at 44. 
82. Brief of Petitioner at 46 57, Sharp, 139 S. Ct. 626 (No. 17-1107). 
83. Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896, 966 67 (10th Cir. 2017) (Tymkovich, J., concurring). 
84. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2468. 
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practices instead of 85 Solem
land is set aside for an Indian reservation and no matter what happens to the title of 
individual plots within the area, the entire block retains its reservation status until Congress 
86
As to the latter two Solem principles, the Court cautioned that extratextual 
considerations hardly supply the blank check Oklahoma 87 Specifically, when 
88 Extratextual sources may only be consulted 
89 Even then, not all 
extratextual sources are created equal. For example, a flood of white settlers onto Indian 
settlers in good faith thought the Creek lands no 
 i
90 The muddy and conflicting history 
surrounding Indian country in Okl
91
treaties and statutes 92
Were the Court to allow such extratextual evidence to disestablish a reservation 
finish work Congress has left undone, usurp the legislative function in the process, and 
93 In fact, the 
Court stated, established law gives special meaning to Native American claims. Therefore, 
a disestablishment standard that would allow extratextual evidence to abrogate a statutory 
disestablishment may not be lightly inferred and treaty rights are to be construed in favor, 
94
95 d be permitted in any other area of 
96
Finally, the Court held the expectations of the modern inhabitants of the subject land 
plays no role in discerning congressional inte
regarding the disruption and administrative burdens that might be caused to its inhabitants 
as a result of honoring the treaty promise to the Muscogee (Creek) Nation could not serve 
85. Id.
86. Id. (quoting Solem, 465 U.S. at 470). 
87. Id. at 2469. 
88. Id.
89. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2469.
90. Id. at 2473. 
91. Id. at 2474. 
92. Id. at 2476. 
93. Id. at 2470. 
94. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2470.
95. Id. at 2474. 
96. Id. 
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 56 [2020], Iss. 3, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol56/iss3/8
2021] THE INDIAN TREATY CANON AND MCGIRT V. OKLAHOMA 415 
as a basis to find disestablishment or to somehow evade the jurisdictional effect of a ruling 
97
us to disrega 98 If the law is really so harmful, it is the province of the 
legislature, not the courts, to change it.99
Thus, the Court reverted to its original bright-line standard for abrogation of a treaty 
right of any kind:  
If Congress wishes to withdraw its promises, it must say so. Unlawful acts, performed long 
enough and with sufficient vigor, are never enough to amend the law. To hold otherwise 
would be to elevate the most brazen and longstanding injustices over the law, both rewarding 
wrong and failing those in the right.100
After McGirt, there are no longer two different standards for abrogation of tribal 
treaty rights. The result in McGirt recent emphasis in 
Herrera numerous decisions since 1896 firmly Congress must 
clearly express  any intent to abrogate Indian treaty rights. 101   
V. CONCLUSION
McGirt v. Oklahoma 
unwarranted dual-track analysis of abrogation of treaty rights, bringing its previously 
erroneous standard for abrogation of a treaty right to a homeland in harmony with the 
relatively bright-line standard for abrogation of treaty usufructuary rights.  
97. Id. at 2480. 
98. Id. at 2481. 
99. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2481 82 ( Congress remains free to supplement its statutory directions about the 
lands in question at any time. ). 
100. Id. at 2482. 
101 Herrera Mille Lacs
Fishing Vessel Menominee Tribe
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